Today, the Northern Cheyenne Reservation stretches west from the Tongue River over more than 400,000 acres of pine forests, gurgling streams, natural springs, and lush grasslands in southeastern Montana. During the 1870s the Cheyenne people nearly lost control of this land, however, because the federal government was trying to forcibly remove them from their homeland and confi ne them to an agency in Oklahoma. In both popular and scholarly histories of the establishment of the reservation, Dull Knife and Little Wolf have been exalted as heroes who led their people back to their Tongue River Valley homeland. As anyone who has listened to or read this history knows, these Cheyenne acted with great bravery and overcame brutal obstacles to return from Oklahoma to their northern homeland. Even so, this is only half the story of the Northern Cheyenne fi ght to remain in southeastern Montana. As Dull Knife and Little Wolf made their arduous journey to escape from the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho agency, other Northern Cheyenne still living in the Tongue River Valley were struggling to remain there. Th e unpublicized sacrifi ces of these families ensured that the men, women, and children following Dull Knife and Little Wolf and other Cheyenne refugees had a secure place to call home once they returned. Each group of Northern Cheyenne fought to maintain their presence in their homeland while drawing on diff erent culturally informed strategies to achieve success.
Th is story of these Northern Cheyenne families begins aft er the Battle of Little Big Horn in 1876. Aft er the battle, military offi cials worked ceaselessly to bring Cheyenne, Lakota, and Arapaho camps into agencies on the northern plains. Th ese military maneuvers led to an encoun-ter that both the military offi cials involved and later historians would portray as a Cheyenne surrender. From a Cheyenne perspective, however, the actions associated with this encounter closely resembled those that Plains nations oft en took to negotiate the creation of military alliances among themselves. Th ese alliances were sealed by gift exchanges, frequently instigated by captives, and oft en reinforced by adoptions or marriages. Once established, the two former enemies fought alongside each other and shared previously disputed territories. 1 To instigate peace, Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commanding offi cer at Fort Keogh, encouraged Two Moons and a small group of Cheyenne to come to Fort Keogh to negotiate terms using gift s presented by a Cheyenne woman captured by the soldiers days earlier. Bolstered by this approach, the group agreed to talk, and the two groups successfully established peace. More surprisingly, most of the young men soon enlisted as scouts with Miles, even though they had been fi ghting against the US military only a few months before. Th is negotiation has been represented in the literature as a military surrender. Miles even described it as such in his correspondence. Nevertheless, this is not a simple narrative of a people forced to adapt and assimilate aft er their resistance was quashed. Th is response refl ected specifi cally Cheyenne perceptions of the situation, resulting in actions that held a meaning for the participating Cheyenne people that was diff erent from that for the European Americans.
Two Moons and his people certainly realized the gravity that their response to Miles would hold in shaping their future, and they looked at their own strategies for obtaining peace while reshaping their expectations to confront the restrictive demands of the colonizing nationstate that Miles represented. Th ey employed creativity in negotiating for peace with General Miles, establishing a newly forged relationship that was relatively intuitive to them because it was similar to past Plains military negotiations leading to alliances, but it also creatively accommodated the pressures of the US military presence in their territory. Th e Cheyenne weighed the benefi ts of a certain level of accommodation, knowing it would relieve some of the immediate military pressure and allow them to remain in their homeland a little while longer. By incorporating Cheyenne styles of alliance building into their negotiations, however, Two Moons's people also bought some time to reassess their strategy to maintain their distinctness as a people and to set the stage for future negotiations.
It is easy to polarize the indigenous response to the encroachment of the nation-state into resistance or assimilation. As Frederick Hoxie points out, the role of Indigenous people in the narrative of American history has been to "resist, adapt, negotiate, endure, and persist. " Such narratives obscure Native people's diverse and creative responses to the continuously evolving relationship between themselves, settlers, government offi cials, other tribes, and political and economic power holders in Washington and around the world whose actions and decisions aff ected their daily lives. Th ese narratives also assume that a settler society in the United States is the inevitable outcome of the encounter between European Americans and Native peoples. Recent scholars have thoroughly undermined this premise, arguing that Native nations oft en dominated political encounters with Europeans and Americans when they fi rst settled in a particular landscape. 2 Nevertheless, the narrative that, through their resistance, Native people became victimized survivors of state-based colonial violence has been politically and socially powerful. Northern Cheyenne people and their allies have utilized this rhetoric in public forums to gain recognition of the unjust impositions of the colonial actions of settler states. For example, making eastern European American sympathizers aware of Dull Knife's and Little Wolf 's plight at the time they were struggling to return home benefi ted their people and gave them the support of powerful men and women-philanthropists and politicians who swayed public opinion and impacted federal policy. 3 Today Northern Cheyenne people certainly use the names and narratives of Dull Knife and Little Wolf much more oft en than those of Two Moons by naming buildings aft er them, relating their histories in public forums about current challenges, and using them as role models for young people. Although such a discourse can eff ectively elicit sympathy and sometimes provoke lasting reform, it also has the danger of painting the Cheyenne people as so fragmented, economically deprived, and culturally stagnant that they are not capable of strategically mobilizing the language of the state. Th e Northern Cheyenne become little more than victims of state violence whose resistance convinces non-Native supporters to fi ght for their cause. As Scott Richard Lyons points out, narratives can colonize as well. 4 Although this narrative powerfully justifi es Cheyenne resistance to the violence perpetrated on them by the nation-state, it also implies that the United States granted them the reservation; ultimately, this story represents the Northern Cheyenne as a defeated people who passively received their land.
At the same time, these narratives are characterized by violence. Ned Blackhawk notes that it is diffi cult to interpret these histories outside of the violent disruptions instigated by European and American intrusion. 5 Violence is a useful analytical tool for interpreting Northern Cheyenne strategies, but the result is certainly more complex than sorting groups into the victors and the victimized. Th e Northern Cheyenne responded to the violence of the threat of removal, the intrusion into their territory, and the destruction of their game and resources with both violence and diplomacy. Th ey both participated in the violence and worked to mitigate it. Arguing that this Native nation never surrendered to General Miles but instead built an alliance with him demonstrates that the United States failed to gain a clear victory. Instead, the Northern Cheyenne creatively forged their own path.
Such creative responses to violence oft en undermined the goals of the state. Settler colonies are grounded on the erasure of Indigenous societies both physically and culturally. Colonial powers used divide-andconquer strategies, like enlisting Native peoples as scouts, as a part of this agenda. Without question, the US military enlisted Native scouts to help subdue Native nations, erase their claims to the landscape, and confi ne the people to small patches of land. Oft en without these scouts, the military would have failed, and as a result, scouts and their families were rewarded for this aid. 6 Needless to say, their participation does not imply that Native scouts agreed with the colonial agenda of their offi cers. Native people were well practiced at reading European and European American divisions to gain opportunities to exercise initiative in the interaction and to manipulate the situation to their advantage. 7 Because the army depended on them so heavily, scouts were in a unique position to gain such opportunities. Of course, by 1877 Cheyenne people had less power to manipulate European Americans but were not left entirely without strategies. Th erefore, as Hoxie argues, "the complex mixture of resistance and adaptation is a permanent feature of indigenous life within settler colonial states. " 8 Although the military campaigns against them had placed them under immense pressure, they did not succumb to despair.
Th e Cheyenne responded to the colonial process of American settlement by participating in what Marshall Sahlins calls a culturally in-formed process of interpretation and adaptation. 9 Th ey drew on an ageold strategy to construct an alliance with an enemy, but this enemy did not play by the same rules, so they had to adapt to the new game. Scott Richard Lyons's metaphor of the x-mark is useful to understanding the drive behind becoming scouts for these Cheyenne men. He argues: "Th e x-mark is a contaminated and coerced sign of consent made under conditions that are not of one's making. " 10 He recognizes that such an act represents both power and the loss of power at the same moment. Th is was certainly true of becoming a scout in the US military. Th ese men were stuck between a rock and a hard place, and yet they could still fi nd a path for themselves. Lyons points out that in the x-mark there still exists "the prospect of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results. " 11 Th e Cheyenne had had plenty of experience with x-marks by that point in time; perhaps they went into this agreement hoping to take advantage of this indeterminacy.
Th e history of Two Moons and his people reveals that they interpreted the language of the state in an attempt to predict its actions, used this knowledge to determine their own best course of action based on Cheyenne cultural expectations, and fi nally manipulated the structures of the colonial machine to adapt to the immediate dangers posed by US military actions. Oft en adaptation becomes a necessary component of resistance, particularly if Native people shape the process and are able to set some of the terms of their participation. Becoming scouts certainly was a form of adaptation, but this sacrifi ce resulted in strengthening the Northern Cheyenne's ability to resist removal from their northern homeland, to welcome home Dull Knife and Little Wolf once they had escaped removal, and to convince the United States to establish a permanent land base recognized as legitimate by the state. By establishing what the Northern Cheyenne viewed as an alliance through Plains-style diplomacy, this group placed itself in the position to assert some autonomy in their relationships with other Native nations and even with the United States.
Negotiating for Peace and Establishing an Alliance
One of the most compelling indications that the Northern Cheyenne viewed their relationship with General Miles as a military alliance was the way in which it was established. By April 1877 both Miles, who was stationed at Fort Keogh, and Gen. George R. Crook at Red Cloud Agency were still struggling to contain the Cheyenne and Lakota who had left the agencies around the time of the Battle of Little Big Horn. Neither Crook nor Miles could win a decisive military victory over these camps. 12 Both generals decided to turn to Plains-style diplomacy, but both had to depend on Native go-betweens to accomplish negotiations. Miles had much more at stake in his attempt to gain control over Plains people away from their agencies because he desired promotion to establish a successful military career. 13 He was competing against a wellestablished general to impress his superiors. Moreover, the Cheyenne and Lakota knew the Red Cloud Agency; they went there to receive rations and had relatives living near the fort. Most likely, this group already had suspicions about Fort Keogh, because a group of Crow scouts working for Miles had killed a party of Lakota leaders on their way to the fort, carrying a white fl ag.
14 Not surprisingly, the Lakota go-betweens Crook sent managed to convince most of these warriors and families to come to the Red Cloud Agency. 15 Because he took advice from a Cheyenne woman who agreed to act as a go-between, Miles was also able to employ Plains Indian diplomacy to encourage a group of Cheyenne to come to Fort Keogh. Th is action had a lasting impact on both the Northern Cheyenne people and on Miles's career.
Sweet Woman, the Cheyenne woman Miles turned to, educated him in the ways of Plains Indian diplomacy, showing him how to negotiate peace using a captive woman as a conduit and off ering gift s to demonstrate his goodwill. Sweet Woman, as the captive woman, instigated and led this diplomatic endeavor. 16 Ms. ST, a descendant of members of the Cheyenne camp who negotiated with Miles, related the following story of this encounter. 17 Miles was not able to bring the Lakota and Cheyenne to Fort Keogh because he could not manage to get close to them. Th ere was a Cheyenne woman living at Fort Keogh named Sweet Woman who was a good friend of General Miles. 18 In fact, Miles's men had captured this woman. Miles asked Sweet Woman for help, wanting to know how he could get close to these bands. She told him to bring them gift s of blankets, sugar, coff ee, bacon, beans, and tobacco. Sweet Woman agreed to travel to their camp with an interpreter, who would listen to what they had to say. Th e interpreter and his men piled their horses high with gift s, and then Sweet Woman and these men rode to meet Two Moons and his followers. 19 Miles was playing by the rules of Plains diplomacy-whether he realized it or not, he was about to create a military alliance with these Cheyenne that would demand obligations from both parties.
A small group of Cheyenne, Two Moons among them, decided that they would listen to Miles's off er for peace. When this group arrived at Fort Keogh, Miles met with the headmen in his cabin. He told them that if they gave up their arms and their horses and placed themselves under his care, he would treat them well. John Stands in Timber related that Miles told the Cheyenne headmen that he wanted peace and that he would let them choose a place for their own reservation if they came to the fort. 20 Ms. ST described the Northern Cheyenne response, stating they had accepted his gift s, so they shook hands and agreed to move to the fort. 21 She explicitly connects the gift s with the agreement to come to the fort, demonstrating that, as for many Native people, in this situation gift giving was central to establishing peace. Two Moons told Miles that he would go back to his people and return to the fort with them, but Miles was afraid that they would change their minds when they reached their camp, so he asked for volunteers from the party to remain. When no one else came forward, White Bull agreed to stay. 22 Miles immediately asked him to become a scout, and he agreed. Only one day aft er the band had arrived, White Bull was sworn in and given a uniform. Once the other Cheyenne saw that White Bull was being treated well, other men off ered to stay as well, including Little Chief, and two Lakota men, Hump and Horse Road.
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Two Moons traveled back to the Cheyenne camp, relayed Miles's terms, and returned to Fort Keogh with the families who wished to join him. When they arrived, they surrendered their fi rearms and their horses. In the eyes of the US government, they became prisoners of war. Th e letters and documents produced by both local and federal offi cials used the terms "surrender" and "prisoners" to describe this encounter, but the offi cials who composed these documents recognized that such terms were not apt descriptors. Th e Select Committee's "Report on the Removal of the Northern Cheyenne" stated that Miles spoke of the Cheyenne as "prisoners of war"; however, it noted that "this was only a nominal capture, and the Indians were treated as prisoners of war because the army could not hold or provide for them in any other character. " 24 Basically, the army had no category for the Cheyenne, so they could only fund them under the category of "prisoner. " In fact, the strongest evidence that they were not considered prisoners at the fort is that the men were almost immediately issued guns and horses in their capacity as US military scouts. Th ey had their own camp and could come and go as they pleased. Th e women set up their own tipis or used army tents and cooked for their families instead of depending on the fort's cook or barracks.
By 1877 Miles's experience with campaigns against Native people had been extensive. Aft er getting noticed by his superiors in the Civil War, Miles was transferred west. In 1874 he made a name for himself in the Red River War (also known as the Kiowa-Comanche War). Shortly aft er the Cheyenne and Lakota victory at the Battle of Little Big Horn, Miles was sent to the area to establish a fort. He built Fort Keogh where the Yellowstone and the Tongue Rivers meet and commenced to carry out his mission to contain all Plains peoples that remained beyond the control of the agencies. An ambitious man, many of Miles's actions during the Wars on the Plains can be understood as part of his eff orts to gain the attention of Washington and to attain a generalship. 25 Miles had already unsuccessfully attempted to impress his superiors by trying to bring Crazy Horse to Fort Keogh. Th e Crow scouts who undertook this mission had less incentive to pursue diplomacy as enemies of the Lakota, and the endeavor ended in violence. 26 Encouraging a small group of Cheyenne to come to his fort granted Miles only limited success because he failed to demonstrate that he could outstrip Crook, who used Lakota scouts to convince Crazy Horse and most of the other Cheyenne and Lakota to travel to the Red Cloud Agency. 27 Regardless, Miles had now formed a large contingent of Cheyenne scouts to serve on his campaigns, realizing that these men would give him the same advantage over the Northern Plains that Crook drew from the Lakota scouts he enlisted.
General Miles may not have realized how much these Cheyenne men would propel his career forward at the time. One of the US soldiers who fought with the Cheyenne scouts recalled his experience:
My fi rst real scouting was done with a party of them [Northern Cheyenne], Little Chief, Brave Wolf, Black Wolf, White Bear and White Bull Hump and they were of the 7th cavalry. Th e army had an idea that they had only surrendered a short while before and could not be trusted.
It became apparent rather quickly, however, that the Cheyenne scouts could be trusted. Th ey were quite successful at bringing in groups the army could not subdue. In fact, the Cheyenne scouts who served at Fort Keogh accomplished some of the most famous US military victories of the day, elevating Miles's status as an accomplished offi cer. First they fought Lame Deer and his band of Minneconjoux Lakota, ultimately forcing their surrender so that Miles could confi ne them to Fort Keogh. Later, when Chief Joseph's band of Nez Perce had continued to elude the army, the Northern Cheyenne scouts picked up their trail and gave the US government the advantage it needed to contain them. 29 Th ese scouts also helped to remove Sitting Bull and his band from Canada. Considering the central role of the Cheyenne scouts to these campaigns, General Miles recognized that enlisting these men enhanced both the military's and his own reputation in the eyes of the federal government. 30 Th e scouts brought him success that would win him favor in Washington, leading eventually to his promotion to a general.
From a Cheyenne perspective, however, fi ghting for the United States was a more confl icted endeavor. Because they were quite familiar with Native scouts both on the battlefi eld and at their agencies, these scouts surely understood the grave impact this choice made on their personal lives and the future of their people. By becoming scouts, they sacrifi ced the freedom that came from remaining away from the agencies, they aided an enemy that had stolen their land and ravaged their communities, and they eventually would have to fi ght against their Native allies. Th omas Dunlay and David Smits both attempt to answer the question that naturally emerges from this history: Were these men betraying their own people? 31 Th ey argue that scouting off ered opportunities to strike a blow at a traditional enemy or a steady income for men confi ned to reservations with no way to feed their starving families. Smits argues that scouting gave men a legitimate vehicle for demonstrating their military prowess and gaining honors. 32 Scouts' families also received benefi ts such as access to army rations and supplies from the fort's commissary. Th is was certainly true for the Northern Cheyenne living at Fort Keogh. Th ose who came to the fort to negotiate with General Miles had not yet successfully been confi ned to an agency, so they were not motivated by the chance to escape the oppressive suff ocation of reservation life or to supplement the insuffi cient rations distributed by the Bureau of Indian Aff airs. Nevertheless, they were under extreme pressure of a diff erent nature. Th ey had spent the good part of a year attempting to outmaneuver the cavalry, dodging its bullets with families in tow. Th is was not the only threat posed to the Cheyenne at this time, however, because the US government already had plans to remove them from their homeland and to confi ne them in Oklahoma.
Th e US military disapproved of the transfer of the Bureau of Indian Aff airs from the War Department to the Interior Department and believed that this led to the mismanagement of relations with Native people. 33 During the later part of the nineteenth century, some military leaders strongly condemned removal as a way to contain and control Native populations because it oft en led to bloodshed, and the army took the brunt of the blame. Th ey viewed Native service in the military as a way to protect people threatened with removal. According to Cheyenne oral histories concerning Two Moons's original negotiations at Fort Keogh, Miles off ered this group a permanent home in the north. Considering the common perception among military offi cers, Miles might have been attempting to undermine the power of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to remove them. He was certainly opposed to the removal, telling the Senate Committee investigating it: "I at the time regarded the order sending these Indians down to Indian Territory as unfortunate and the movement unwise. " 34 He went on to describe the act as a "banishment, " calling it "unjust and cruel. " 35 Th ese Cheyenne men certainly had gained enough familiarity with the United States to know that enlisting as scouts could strengthen their ability to remain in their homeland.
Th e scouts may have also believed that they would be in a position to help their Cheyenne and Lakota relatives remaining away from the agencies. Th ey knew from experience that both Crook and Miles had attempted to negotiate with groups who had left their agencies through Native scouts. In fact, in only a couple of short years, these Cheyenne scouts would be integral to bringing Little Wolf 's people to Fort Keogh without bloodshed. Lt. William P. Clark, saddled with the orders to kill or capture Little Wolf 's party of Cheyenne, relied heavily on Northern Cheyenne scouts and an interpreter to advise him and to negotiate peace with Little Wolf without fi ring a weapon. 36 Certainly, for Little Wolf 's men, who had suff ered from removal to Oklahoma and fought their way back north several years aft er Two Moons's people settled at Fort Keogh, enlisting at the fort as scouts provided security against future removals.
Smits argues, however, that despite the benefi ts scouts gained for themselves and their communities, the majority of those who enlisted did so as prisoners of war and had no other choice. He states that Natives who had surrendered to the military, like Two Moons's people, and those confi ned to reservations "were powerless, deprived of their freedom and homelands, and utterly dependent on the federal government for their most elementary needs. " 37 Th is assessment accurately refl ects the experience of many Native scouts but not that of the Northern Cheyenne. Smits points to George Bird Grinnell's comment that a scout once told him, "My friend, I was a prisoner of war for four years, and all the time was fi ghting for the man that captured me, " as evidence that Native people had little choice but to scout for the US military as conquered people. 38 Grinnell includes this quote in Th e Fighting Cheyenne as part of a discussion about the freedom Cheyenne scouts enjoyed and the satisfaction they felt from their service. 39 Of course, both scholars use the quote to illustrate their own perspectives within very diff erent contexts, but I suggest that this anonymous scout was speaking to Grinnell ironically. Miles himself had stated to the federal government that the scouts were prisoners of war in name alone. Th ese Cheyenne scouts had heard the narratives of their relatives who had been imprisoned at the Cheyenne and Arapaho agency in Oklahoma and at Fort Robinson who had chosen to fl ee for their lives rather than to endure confi nement. It is doubtful that these Cheyenne scouts and their families at Fort Keogh viewed themselves as prisoners of war. Th eir circumstances in comparison to those of their relatives in Oklahoma provided no evidence for such an assumption. Perhaps this scout was using irony to point out that even though federal offi cials had labeled them prisoners of war, the Northern Cheyenne actually had a diff erent relationship with General Miles and other local offi cials because prisoners do not fi ght for their captors. Only enemies who had negotiated a peace and built an alliance fought side by side on the Plains. If this statement was actually meant to be ironic, it adds weight to the idea that these Cheyenne believed they had forged an alliance with General Miles, but by the time Grinnell conducted this interview, they also recognized that European Americans had a diff erent perspective on the relationship.
Still today, Northern Cheyenne people continue to assert that their people never surrendered, even when discussing Two Moons or Little Wolf. Instead they discuss the relationship the Northern Cheyenne formed with Miles and other offi cials as one between equals. Fighting against their former allies, especially the Lakota, was a decision not made lightly, but this new military alliance demanded it. In an interview during the summer of 2005, Ms. ST described the power of the alliance the Cheyenne scouts built with General Miles for their people. She stated that his dedication to the Northern Cheyenne's eff orts to remain in their homeland began at the Lame Deer Battle when White Bull saved the general's life. Some Lakota were surrendering and had laid their guns on the ground, but one, possibly Lame Deer himself, had left his cocked. White Bull had warned Miles by pointing this out with his eyes. When the warrior went for his gun, Miles was ready and ducked away, dodging the bullet. Miles then thanked all the scouts for their help. He told them he would give them whatever they asked for out of gratitude. Th e scouts of the other Plains nations who fought said they wanted all the captured horses, so he gave them all away to these scouts. When Miles asked White Bull what he wanted, he said, "Promise me you will let us live on this land and not make us leave. " Ms. ST related that because Miles gave his word, he fought hard to secure land for the Northern Cheyenne. 40 Th is story lends validity to the assertion that the people never surrendered. It also emphasizes that Cheyenne people took an active role in remaining on and securing their homeland. Drawing on their own understandings of state power wielded by the US government, these Cheyenne men and their families manipulated the structures of the colonial machine to meet the needs of their community using the opportunities that emerged.
Ms. DG, a Cheyenne elder, noted that the Northern Cheyenne who scouted for Miles made a great sacrifi ce, stating that they gave up the old ways and started living like white people; they stopped moving across the Plains and stayed in one place. She notes that they also fought for the US military at times against their own friends. She points to these sacrifi ces as the way the Northern Cheyenne eventually obtained their own reservation in Montana. 41 Ms. DG spoke of these Cheyenne scouts who gave up so much with high esteem. She did not characterize their actions as assimilationist or as selling out to the government; she instead spoke of these sacrifi ces with respect and recognition of their ultimate power.
Miles's gift s and promises and the enlistment of these Cheyenne as scouts demonstrate that the Cheyenne could have thought of this relationship as an alliance that entailed certain obligations. Moreover, Northern Cheyenne scouts at Fort Keogh spoke of this relationship in such terms. At the Senate hearing on removal of the Northern Cheyenne in 1880, Little Chief explicitly connected scouting for Miles with rights to not only horses and guns but land. He stated that Miles had told him to comply with removal to Oklahoma, but if his people did not like it there, they could return. He continued:
Th ere would not be much trouble in doing that, because, he (Miles) said, the government knew of the valuable services we had rendered helping him in the Nez Perce campaign; also in capturing the Lame Deer Sioux village. . . . When we surrendered to General Miles we gave up all our horses and arms; aft erward he gave us back some horses to scout for him-also some arms to scout with. 42 Little Chief made it clear to the committee that the scouts expected to be able to keep the horses and guns aft er removal because they were given to them for their service. Th e relationship also demanded access to land. Years later, Northern Cheyenne leaders continued to reference their service in conversations about land. In a council with government offi cials held in 1890 about the Cheyenne reservation, Howling Wolf brought up the forging of the original alliance with General Miles, speaking of Sweet Woman to invoke the legitimacy of the alliance. He began by declaring that the soldiers and the Cheyenne had been friends for a long time, pointing to the beginning of their friendship as the negotiation initiated by Miles and facilitated by Sweet Woman. At the same meeting, Howling Wolf stated, "He [Miles] didn't abuse her [Sweet Woman] but took good care of her. " 43 Brave Wolf also pointed to General Miles for proof of their rights to their homeland. He said, "You ask us about our land. I will tell you the truth. General Miles is our friend. I feel as if he was our brother. My people have always helped him. General Miles put us here. " 44 White Bull added, "You are talking about General Miles. He promised we should live here until we are all old men. " 45 For the Northern Cheyenne, the relationship they had established with Miles fi rst through Sweet Woman and then later as scouts gave them rights to the land. Surely the Cheyenne felt certain that these rights were established through Plains-style diplomacy and then underscored as the two groups fought side by side, as Brave Wolf said, "as if he was our brother. " Among Plains nations, a military alliance oft en also implied joint rights to territory. Because of their alliance, the Cheyenne argued that the US government, represented by Miles, had an obligation to secure the people a permanent home in Montana.
Homesteading to Secure the Claim to This Land
Furthermore, the alliance was not simply constructed as a Cheyenne institution through a unidirectional, culturally informed process of interpretation. Although General Miles most likely did not view his agreement with the scouts as an alliance among equals, he recognized the unique nature of it as well, acknowledging that the Cheyenne had never truly been prisoners of war. Although what he had forged with these Cheyenne did not fi t a neat category within US diplomacy, Miles realized it did entail obligations on his part, and he ultimately attempted to live up to them by helping to secure a permanent place for the Northern Cheyenne in the Tongue River Valley. Of course, he interpreted his commitment through a culturally informed process as well, one that promoted assimilation for Native peoples. Between 1880 and 1882, General Miles sought to keep the Northern Cheyenne on their land by encouraging them to move away from the fort and begin homesteading. In 1875 Congress passed the American Indian Homestead Act, stating that Natives could apply for homesteads provided that they had already or would at some point abandon their tribal relations. 46 Just like the Homestead Act of 1862, which allowed other Americans to take land, the Indian Homestead Act allowed each Native person to claim 160 acres. Ms. ST stated that when the people fi rst arrived at Fort Keogh, they were placed in barracks, but the military was worried about them at the fort. Th ey then began camping near the fort, but Miles did not like this either. So he worked hard to fi nd them their own land. Miles wanted them to be living away from the fort, so he encouraged them to move south into the Tongue River Valley and take homesteads. 47 Both Ms. ST and Ms. DG argued that Miles was instrumental in supporting the Northern Cheyenne settlement in Montana and establishing US government recognition of this settlement. Because he encouraged the people to settle on the land in a way non-Natives recognized as legitimate, General Miles proved benefi cial to the Northern Cheyenne's eff orts to remain in the Tongue River Valley.
Th is might make Miles look like he was exceptionally heroic, but it falls in line with the military's opinion of the failures of federal Indian policy. Miles kept his promise to the Northern Cheyenne who scouted, using his own cultural interpretation of the relationship. He believed their best option was to assimilate to Western lifestyles through military life, ranching, and farming. Miles stated that he believed that Native people would benefi t from owning land in severalty, but he also argued that Plains people like the Cheyenne should own cattle fi rst and that farming would come gradually. He told the Senate committee that "the savage is usually fi rst a hunter, then a herdsman, or shepherd; next he cultivates the ground. You cannot expect them at fi rst to be satisfi ed with one hundred and sixty acres of land and nothing else, when they have been accustomed to roam over a whole Territory. " 48 Clearly his views on Native people were racist and demeaning. In fact, Miles was parroting a common belief among military men that scouting would be the fi rst step for Native people in the process of assimilation. 49 In implementing these ideals among the Northern Cheyenne, however, he provided the people with some valuable leverage when negotiating with representatives of the federal government. Scouting and homesteading were two items on the very limited list of options the Northern Cheyenne had in 1877. Nevertheless, these Cheyenne continued to analyze these choices in a culturally informed process designed to strategically use their service and their personal relationships as a way to meet their own goals while adapting to the US colonial presence.
Although the process of taking up homesteads along the Tongue River was essential in establishing a permanent Cheyenne presence in the area at that time, the majority of historical sources fail to mention this. Most sources explain the slow trickle of Northern Cheyenne returning to the Tongue River region in Montana as the result of Little Wolf 's banishment. Because he had killed another Cheyenne man in the winter of 1880 while at Fort Keogh, Little Wolf banished himself from the community as Cheyenne law required of murderers. He moved with his family to a spot on Muddy Creek just a few miles from where the town of Lame Deer is located today. 50 Little Wolf stopped here because he had reached the home of William Rowland and his family. 51 Rowland had married a Cheyenne woman and had lived with the Cheyenne for most of his life. 52 By 1880 he was living in a small cabin along Muddy Creek. Ms. DG pointed out that the Rowlands were really the fi rst to live in the area of the present-day reservation. 53 In his banishment, Little
Wolf had turned to other members of his community. Eventually, those who followed him as a chief left Fort Keogh and joined him in the same area. General Miles was not concerned with bringing these families back because he no longer had to provide space and food for them at the already crowded fort. 54 During the same period, Miles encouraged Northern Cheyenne families to move into the country along Tongue River and select places to live. In the council held in 1890, Howling Wolf remembered that aft er Miles's scouts apprehended Sitting Bull, Miles must have written to Washington to ask about this country. Aft er awhile General Miles heard from Washington that, now he and the Cheyennes were friends, he could put them wherever they wanted to go. Aft er awhile General Miles sent for two head men and told them that he wanted us to go up on the Rosebud and settle down there, that it belonged to us.
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Certainly this is speculative and fi ltered through a Cheyenne perspective. 56 Nevertheless, the statement clearly demonstrates that the Northern Cheyenne felt that Miles was fi ghting for their right to remain in the Tongue River valley and viewed his actions as a legitimization of their right to the territory. Th e Northern Cheyenne families at Fort Keogh did receive permission from Washington to establish homesteads in the area. 57 Soon they began to look around Lame Deer and Muddy Creek to fi nd good places to live. By 1883 many other Cheyenne had left Fort Keogh to join their friends and family in the wooded valleys along the Rosebud and Tongue Rivers. John Stands in Timber described this land: "You can't fi nd country like this anywhere else no matter how far you go. Th ere was plenty of wood, and good water, and range, and many kinds of game. It was the place they had in mind all the time. " 58 Th e Northern Cheyenne skillfully interpreted the assimilationist goals of US Indian policy behind scouting and homesteading and adapted to them. At the same time, they responded to these pressures creatively by manipulating the relationship with General Miles to ensure they could shape the form these adaptations took. Th ey sought land in their favorite territory and wanted to gain offi cial support for settlement there. Furthermore, their cultural perspective of negotiation and alliance informed the actions and rhetoric they used to manipulate US offi cials, including Miles. By using terms like "friend" and "brother" when referring to Miles and emphasizing that these relationships gave them rights to territory, they secured Miles's aid in remaining on their land.
Asserting Rights to Territory through the Military Alliance with Miles
Although many Northern Cheyenne families settled in the Rosebud and Tongue River Valleys during the 1880s, leading to the establishment of an executive order reservation in 1884, by the 1890s the Cheyenne were threatened with removal once again. James McLaughlin, who had been the agent at Standing Rock during the Wounded Knee massacre, was appointed as the inspector who would investigate the situation at the Tongue River Reservation and determine whether it was advisable to move the Cheyenne onto the Crow Reservation. 59 He arrived at the agency on August 13, 1898, and promptly called together a council to discuss the matter with the Cheyenne themselves. He determined from speaking with them and with the Crow that neither wanted to live on the same reservation and reported that, "although the Crows and Northern Cheyennes are neighbors, there is not the most cordial feeling between them. " 60 McLaughlin devoted only a few sentences of his report to discussing the enmity between the two nations. He was more concerned with the rights that the Cheyenne insisted that they had to the land. He stated, "Th e Northern Cheyenne Indians are very much attached to the country they now occupy, many of them having been born and reached manhood within its borders; besides they have had the assurance of government offi cials from time to time that they would be permitted to remain there undisturbed. " 61 Th eir connection to the land seemed to impress McLaughlin, and he apparently took what they told him in council quite seriously. Furthermore, he did not simply dismiss the promises they obtained from government offi cials to remain in the area of the Tongue River.
McLaughlin told Congress that several Cheyenne had either originals or copies of letters from government offi cials that they had kept as evidence of the government's reliability. He cites two of these letters in full, one from Gen. Nelson A. Miles and the other from T. J. Morgan, commissioner of Indian Aff airs. In his letter, dated 1889, Miles recounted the many important services the Northern Cheyenne provided for the government, beginning with their trip to negotiate at his fort, stating that it paved the way for the end of the War on the Plains. Miles continued the letter by describing in detail their service as scouts against Lame Deer and Chief Joseph. He then argued, "Th ey were told that if they remained at peace and did what they were directed to do, the Government would treat them fairly and justly. Th ey have fulfi lled their part of the compact, and it would be but justice for the Government to allow them to remain where it has placed them. " 62 For Miles, the Northern Cheyenne claim to the territory around the Tongue River Valley existed regardless of the reservation. He stated in his letter, "Th ey have an undoubted right, legally and morally, to remain where they are now located. " 63 He declared in his letter that this was because they had surrendered their tribal relations to take up homesteads. Yet, in this letter, Miles did not justify the Northern Cheyenne presence in the Tongue River Valley in terms of the progress toward civilization they had made on their homesteads. In fact, he never described the houses they had built, fi elds they had plowed, or cattle they had raisedactions European Americans would have viewed as assimilation. He was arguing from an even stronger position, the promise or compact the Cheyenne had with the government.
Archival documents created by representatives of the United States used the term "surrender" to describe the moments when Plains people came into the agencies. Th e Northern Cheyenne perspective mattered little to federal offi cials in Washington; the Cheyenne had surrendered and as prisoners of war had no rights to the territory. Local offi cials, on the other hand, approached these issues from a more pragmatic perspective. Men like Miles and McLaughlin worked and lived with Native peoples, depending on them not only for their livelihood but sometimes for their very lives. Certainly these relationships rarely were powerful enough to override the prejudices they carried against Native people, and certainly each individual responded diff erently to their encounters. Yet, by the 1880s, some local offi cials had adopted the attitude that working with Native peoples to resolve concerns more eff ectively achieved their assimilationist goals than being heavy handed.
Furthermore, the term "surrender" oft en obscures the actuality that the Northern Cheyenne who came in to Fort Keogh did not believe they had surrendered in the European American sense of the term and that Miles did not consider these men, women, and children to be prisoners of war. Th e two parties had made an agreement that surely looked to the Northern Cheyenne like the alliances they had made with other Plains peoples in the past. Miles himself called the agreement a "compact" and implied that this compact substantiated Northern Cheyenne rights to the territory. Although he does not come all the way out and say that they were promised this land in the compact, his letter refl ected the kind of outcomes that Plains peoples would have expected when creating alliances in the past.
Miles underscored the importance of the social relationship he developed with the Northern Cheyenne by relating the events of what he called "surrender, " stating it was in good faith and then describing Northern Cheyenne military service at Fort Keogh. 64 Clearly Miles understood the Northern Cheyenne military service as pivotal to their rights to the Tongue River Valley. In his letter, he used the term "compact" and mentioned justice and morality, clearly supporting the Northern Cheyenne's right to settle in the Tongue River Valley, to hunt, and to prosper on their own. Furthermore, he made a promise to the scouts when they saved his life at the battle against Lame Deer to allow them to remain on their land. Regardless of whether Miles understood his relationship with the Northern Cheyenne to be an alliance, he felt responsible to them because of the social bonds they shared. It is easy to see why Cheyenne people held onto this letter as proof. Th ey had fought next to him and had accepted him as a friend. Looking back, one might suspect Miles of envisioning himself in a romantic colonial fantasy of the Native who willingly complies with invasion and embraces assimilation. Perhaps he did, but I believe that from a Cheyenne perspective, the letter instead refl ects a strategic use of Plains political discourse and creative alliance building. Th ey had convinced Miles of the validity of their compact, including a guarantee of rights to the land around the Tongue River.
In their two councils with McLaughlin, the fi rst held August 17, 1898, and the second held October 6, 1898, the Northern Cheyenne present referred to their agreement with Miles regularly. 65 Two Moons's statement to McLaughlin is worth quoting in its entirety:
My friend, we are glad to see you and have you with us. You were a long time with our friends, the Sioux, and we have heard of you and that you are a good friend of the Indians. We don't want you to try and get land for us any place away from here. Th is is our country, and we want to remain here, and have our children continue to live here aft er we old men are gone. General Miles promised us that we would never be sent away from here, and I hope that you will now make us strong on this reservation.
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Two Moons opened with a warm greeting that not only welcomed McLaughlin but also reminded him of the Cheyenne expectations of him. He had worked to do good things for the Lakota Sioux, who were the Cheyenne's friends, allies, and relatives, and so they expected him to do good things for them as well. Two Moons was clear that they did not want to move and emphasized, "this is our country, " stating that they wanted to remain there for future generations. He sealed his argument by reminding McLaughlin and all gathered there that Miles had promised that they never would have to leave.
Th e Northern Cheyenne surely felt that the Tongue River country was their country for many reasons: they had been living in the area for generations, they had close ties with the Lakota with whom they shared the territory, and they fought hard and won to keep enemies out of that country, including the United States Army, which they defeated only miles from the Tongue River at the Battle of Little Big Horn. Yet the speakers did not mention their military victories as evidence of their rights to the territory; instead, they referred to their historical presence in the area and the alliance they had established. Medicine Bear stated, "Leave us here that we may live and die in a country in which we were born and grew up. " 67 He emphasized that the Cheyenne relationship with this land had stretched back for generations, their parents lived there and gave birth to them there, and they should continue in that country, the life cycle should continue there. Both American Horse and Hairy Hand reminded the inspector that the country had been promised to them by government offi cials, and they wanted to remain in it. 68 White Elk made the connection between the Northern Cheyenne's ownership of the land and their alliance with General Miles explicit when he stated, "We fi rst made peace with the whites on Tongue River, and we want to make our permanent home here. " 69 White Elk's understanding of the connection between making peace in a specifi c landscape and the right to access that landscape did not mirror those of the United States. In the second council, Bobtail Horse and Little Chief reiterated this argument. Bobtail Horse also stated that the Northern Chey-enne made peace with the whites in that region and then reminded all gathered of their military service and how they fought other tribes that were at war with the US government while living in that country. 70 Little Chief also stated that General Miles put them on the land, and they fought against their own friends, the Sioux, on this very land. 71 Th ese speakers underscored the relationship they had with General Miles and illustrated how it gave them rights to this territory. When viewed from a Cheyenne perspective, it is clear that the relationship the Northern Cheyenne scouts forged with General Miles was an alliance, not surrender, and as such guaranteed rights to access the landscape that the two parties protected together.
Gain and Loss
Based on the information he gathered while on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation, McLaughlin recommended another executive order to expand the reservation east to the Tongue River. Th is expansion would more than double the size of the reservation, but it would not encompass the homesteads of the Cheyenne who had settled on the eastern banks of the river. Families outside the reservation boundary had held onto these lands since before 1884 and surely felt that they had every right to that land. In 1898 McLaughlin set out to make an agreement with all the Northern Cheyenne living on the east side of the Tongue River to move onto the reservation if it was expanded. 72 Forty-six Northern Cheyenne men signed their names on the contract that declared that they would abandon their homesteads and move west in exchange for twenty-fi ve dollars to cover their losses. At the same time, McLaughlin negotiated forty-one agreements with American settlers to receive just compensation for the homesteads within the proposed boundaries of the reservation that they would have to abandon. He divided these agreements into four types: bona fi de settlers, or those who had valid titles to their land; equitable rights, or those who had fi nal receiver's receipts but doubtful rights; legal owners, or those who came into their land in a legal way other than homesteading; and squatters, or those who occupied the land illegally. According to McLaughlin's calculations of the values of these parcels of land, the government would owe the fi ft een settlers $91,310, the fi ve equitable rights settlers $12,770, the eight legal landowners $34,670, and the eleven illegal settlers $11,625. 73 Th e US government planned to pay eleven illegal squatters over $11,000 for improvements made on land they did not own, yet they gave fortysix Cheyenne families a total of $1,150 to cover the homes they built on land that had always been theirs. 74 Th e land the American homesteaders would vacate was meant to serve as an inducement for the forty-six Cheyenne families living on the east side of the Tongue River to move west. 75 Clearly the Northern Cheyenne did not fi nd this inducement very compelling. McLaughlin admitted himself that "they were reluctant to leave the east side of Tongue River, but to show their good will and desire to meet the wishes of the Government in having these matters amicably adjusted they all consented. " 76 McLaughlin's statement, however, obscured the negative response he received from the Northern Cheyenne settled on the east side of the Tongue River. Th ey did consent, but not as amicably as McLaughlin wanted to portray. In a council meeting with him, American Horse, Little Chief, and George Standing Elk all stated that they wanted the reservation to be larger than the one that had been proposed, declaring that it should extend beyond the divide east of the Tongue River. 77 Aft er Bobtail Horse pointed to Tongue River as the location where they made peace with the whites, he continued, "We fought all Indian tribes in this country who were at war with the government when we were soldiers of the government, and we would wish a larger reservation than you propose. " 78 He reminded the government that in making peace on the Tongue River and taking up an alliance with the United States in its war, they had a right to the territory, not just because it had always been theirs, but because they were in alliance with the people who claimed it as their own land now. He directly connected fi ghting with the United States to Cheyenne rights to the territory, justifying a larger reservation.
On March 19, 1900 , President William McKinley signed the executive order that expanded the Northern Cheyenne Reservation to its current eastern boundary, the Tongue River. Th is executive order recognized Northern Cheyenne rights to this territory, securing their presence in the Tongue River Valley and ending the discussion over removal to the Crow Reservation. McLaughlin had worked hard to establish reservation boundaries that would suit both the Northern Cheyenne and the US government. Nevertheless, the outcome of the expansion of the reservation remains ambiguous for the Northern Cheyenne people. On the one hand, the reservation gained 204,000 acres, so that with the 1900 executive order, it contained a total of 460,000 acres. 79 On the other hand, the Northern Cheyenne lost recognition of ownership of land on the east side of the Tongue River that they had claimed for generations and had begun homesteading to secure that claim. Furthermore, the Cheyenne who had built homesteads on the east bank lost their land, houses, barns, and any other work they had put into their claims, receiving essentially no compensation for their losses.
Conclusion
Th e Northern Cheyenne who came to settle in southeastern Montana had fought to return to and remain in the Tongue River Valley. Aft er years of struggle, the people fi nally won the security of permanent reservation boundaries with the 1900 executive order. Th ese boundaries were physical evidence that the federal government recognized that the Cheyenne had a sovereign relationship with this territory, but these boundaries certainly did not encompass or defi ne that relationship. Th e Cheyenne knew that they had a right to this land for many reasons. First, they had been camping in the area for generations. Th en, when the military sought to remove them in the 1870s, they fought and won decisive battles on this land, particularly the Battle of Little Big Horn and the Rosebud Battle. Finally and most importantly, they did not surrender to the US government at the end of the fi ghting; instead, they created an alliance with Gen. Nelson Miles. As offi cials in the federal government threatened to revoke the reservation and to remove the Cheyenne from their land, the people invoked their relationship with General Miles to assert their right to remain. Ultimately, Miles was true to his word. He fought for the people who had fought for him. In the end, the Northern Cheyenne won federal recognition of the rights to the land that already was theirs.
Cheyenne people certainly were and are aware of the sacrifi ces Two Moons's people made by becoming scouts, but they must have believed they also had much to gain. Political infl uence for the Cheyenne at the time required seeking a powerful advocate. Certainly Miles's support was not guaranteed, but this group took a calculated risk, choosing what they believed was their best option from a set of choices that all required adaptation to colonial force. Nevertheless, the Northern Cheyenne based this choice on a culturally informed interpretation. Forging an alliance with Miles established a relationship that came with certain responsibilities, not the least of which was sharing territory and defending each other's interests. Many Cheyenne believe he also championed their cause for personal reasons, namely his promise to White Bull. By joining the US military under Nelson Miles, these Northern Cheyenne men positioned themselves to make strategic demands of the state designed to help their community overcome political marginalization by the very same state.
Although Miles supported the alliance because he believe it would aid the state eff orts to assimilate Native people, this alliance and even Cheyenne homesteads were creative adaptations meant to preserve the community and maintain their presence in their homeland. Nevertheless, this strategy was not always successful. Th e discourse of alliance that had worked so well with Miles could not prevent the removal of Cheyenne families from the east bank of the Tongue River. Although it moved McLaughlin the same way it had moved Miles, he simply did not have the power that Miles did. He was able to prevent wholesale removal and did extend the reservation boundary, but he was not able to attain all the land the Cheyenne had claimed. It seems that the Northern Cheyenne had enough experience with the policies and actions of settler colonialism to know that gaining advocacy required a certain amount of adaptation. Furthermore, these strategies had varying levels of success depending on who was in offi ce and the sentiment of the time. So the Cheyenne people adapted, but they made their choices strategically, sacrifi cing, but not so much that their autonomy as a culturally distinct people would be lost.
Notes

